Tribune leader, 12 June 1992
The result of last week's Danish referendum on the
Maastricht treaty has killed the treaty in its present form. Of that there can
be no doubt Maastricht took the form of an amendment to the Treaty of Rome and
all amendments to the Treaty of Rome must be endorsed by all member states. A
few thousand Danes put paid to that.
There is therefore no point, at least at this stage, in
calling for a referendum on Maastricht or in wasting parliamentary time
discussing ratification of Maastricht: Maastricht has fallen.
But this is not the end of the story. Although no one is
quite sure yet of the mechanics of the operation, it is certain that
Maastricht will be resurrected in some form, probably by way of amending part
of the Maastricht deal but possibly through some more thorough renegotiation,
perhaps including changes to the Treaty of Rome to remove its awkward
insistence on unanimity.
The British government, which holds the EC Presidency from
next month, is doing all it can to ensure that only minor changes to the
Maastricht treaty are agreed before another attempt is made to get the Danes'
assent. It is easy to see why. Maastricht without any changes is the best tike
Government can hope for from a treaty on European union. It makes the fight
against inflation the overwhelming priority in European macro-economic policy.
It allows Britain to opt out of common policies on employment rights. It emphasises
the role of the intergovernmental Council of Ministers in overseeing the
European Commission, gives few new powers to the European Parliament, says
nothing about "federalism" and makes much of the principle of
"subsidiarity", interpreted by the Tories as meaning that as much EC business
as possible should be thrashed out behind closed doors by representatives of
national governments.
The British government's particular fear is that, if
Maastricht is subjected to a more thorough renegotiation, Britain will be
forced to accept measures to reduce the "democratic deficit" by
granting substantial new powers to the European Parliament. Far better, think
John Major and Douglas Hurd, to opt for a quick fix, first adding an
"explanatory memorandum" to the existing treaty emphasising the importance
of "decentralisation" and then getting the Danish government to hold
another referendum later in the year.
This strategy is fraught with danger for the Tories. There
is little support for the British position among the other 11 EC Governments
(although what the others actually want is unclear). At home, anti-EC Tory
backbenchers already see an opportunity for wrecking any possibility of
European federalism, with a parliamentary majority of only 21, Mr Major's
position is extremely shaky.
So how should Labour respond? It is clear that it cannot
continue simply to tag along with whatever the government does: at the very
least, Labour must insist that the government drops the Maastricht bill and
submits another after amendments to the treaty have been agreed by the 12. But
it would be foolish for Labour to leave it at that. There is a real possibility
of putting the government under serious pressure on Maastricht, particularly
on the Social Chapter and, more importantly, on the crucial question of making
the EC democratically accountable. Labour must not let it pass.
After this week's meeting of the Parliamentary Labour
Party, it is clear that there is the potential for a consensus among Labour MPs
to vote against Maastricht unless, first, the government reverses its decision
to opt out of the Social Chapter and, secondly, the treaty is made more
democratic.
Here, decentralisation, although desirable, is not in
itself enough: it must be accompanied by measures to democratise the EC at
every level, especially at the centre. Labour must argue consistently and
loudly for a massive increase in the powers of the European Parliament to rein
in the Commission and the Council of Ministers. If it doesn't get what it
wants, it should do all it can to bring the government down.
Kaufman goes: good
riddance
It is remarkable how quickly political reputations can
change. During the general election campaign, Labour's Shadow Foreign
Secretary, Gerald Kaufman, was so invisible that he became an object of
ridicule among political journalists. Last week, just a couple of months on,
the same journalists greeted his announcement that he was retiring from the
Shadow Cabinet with hymns of praise for his political skills.
There is no doubt that Mr Kaufman will be missed by Labour,
and even those who have disagreed with him cannot deny that he has had his good
moments in debate. He has even taken distinctive and principled stands on some
of the great issues of modern international politics, notably South Africa and
Israel/ Palestine.
But it is unlikely that the history books will be as kind to
him as his political obituarists. Mr Kaufman will be remembered as the man who
got Labour to ditch unilateral nuclear disarmament and adopt a policy of
keeping nuclear arms for as long as anyone else has them – a move completed
just weeks before the final collapse of Soviet communism which destroyed for
ever any rationale for the British nuclear deterrent.
On Europe, Mr Kaufman's deep-rooted Atlanticist hostility to
the EC has been a major factor in denying Labour any coherent vision of the
future of the continent. On Hong Kong after Tiananmen Square, he adopted a
stance less principled than Paddy Ashdown’s. During the Gulf crisis of 1990-91,
he meekly followed the government's line. His pronouncements on eastern Europe
were consistently timid and ill-informed before the collapse of communism and
have not improved since. He gave the impression that the leaders of last year's
coup in Moscow were people with whom the west could do business. And so one
could go on.
Labour must replace Mr Kaufman with someone whose approach
is governed less by considerations of Realpolitik
and more by principle. It would also help if he or she had a worked-out idea of
what Britain's place in the world ought to be. Absence of vision has been at
the root of most of Mr Kaufman's many failings.
