Catalyst, autumn 1990
Paul Anderson examines reaction in Europe to the Middle East
crisis
The response of west European governments to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait has been notable both for its incoherence and for its
caution.
There is general support for sanctions against Iraq to secure
its withdrawal from Kuwait and for military deployments to deter Saddam Hussein
from moving into Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. Beyond this, however,
the political and military establishments of Western Europe have little in common
apart from a vague unease at the prospect of being dragged into a bloody war by
the United States.
Even Britain, which, desperate to revive the flagging 'special
relationship', has offered almost unconditional rhetorical support for the
Americans' military deployments and for their insistence that the Kuwaiti royal
family be restored, was at first reluctant to send significant forces to the
Gulf.
Margaret Thatcher might have grabbed headlines on 30 August
by berating the rest of Europe (except France) for its “patchy and
disappointing" response to the Gulf crisis, but for the first month or so
after 2 August Britain's own military contribution was little more than
symbolic.
It was only in early September, after the US Secretary of
State, James Baker, started to complain publicly about the lack of solidarity
shown by America's European allies, that the British Government agreed to send
ground forces to the Gulf (much to the annoyance of the army). And even the
tanks -ancient, unreliable and still in transit - hardly constitute a key
element in anyone's military calculations.
The French response has been even more ambiguous. Initially,
the French sent the carrier Clemenceau to their base in Djibouti (more than two
days' sailing time away from the Gulf), 13 warships to monitor UN sanctions,
and a helicopter reconnaissance squadron to Abu Dhabi - a significant force,
but one carefully designed to reassure Arab opinion that France was not going
to be bounced into over-hasty military action. It was only after the Iraqi
seizure of four French citizens from the French embassy in Kuwait on 14
September that President Mitterrand decided to deploy ground forces on Saudi
territory.
Today the French forces are, on paper, second only to the
Americans in size and firepower. But serious doubts have emerged about the
usefulness of the French deployments. French artillery and armour are incapable
of taking on Iraqi heavy tanks, and the French have too few transport and
tanker aircraft to keep their ground and air forces adequately supplied.
More embarrassingly, the Iraqis are equipped with French
aircraft and missile systems, and many Iraqi pilots were trained in France on
the same equipment that the French themselves are using, rendering French
aircraft extremely vulnerable in combat.
At the same time as making these military deployments, the
French Government has been at pains to emphasise its diplomatic distance from
the Americans - most clearly on 24 September, when Mitterrand outlined a
four-point peace plan to the UN General Assembly. He declared that 'everything
would become possible' if Iraq announced it would withdraw from Kuwait and free
hostages, distancing himself from the US both by omitting reference to
restoration of the Kuwaiti royal family, and by suggesting that there should be
an international conference on the Middle East to resolve all international
disputes in the region.
It is the Germans, however, who have incurred most American
wrath during the Gulf crisis. Not only have they failed to send forces to the
region (a simple matter of being barred by their constitution from out-of-area
military operations, but that seems beside the point in Washington), they were
extremely unwilling to part with cash to pay for the military operation and to
compensate the other Middle East countries hit by anti-Iraq sanctions. It was
only after much huffing and puffing from Congress that Chancellor Helmut Kohl
agreed in early September to cough up 3,300 million Marks-worth of aid and
announced that he wanted the constitution amended after all-German elections in
December to allow German participation in a UN contingent in the Gulf.
Given the differences among Britain, France and Germany, it
is perhaps unsurprising that attempts to secure a united West European response
to the Gulf crisis have not got very far. But there are other factors too - not
least the absence of any adequate institutional framework for co-ordinating
West European policy on the Gulf. NATO is limited by its charter to take
military action only within its area; the European Community has no security
role.
That leaves only the nine-nation West European Union, a
relic of the 50s' attempts to create a West European defence community, which
has been revived to provide a forum for some co-ordination of efforts, particularly
in calling in late September for an air embargo against Iraq.
Nevertheless, the WEU's role has been well short of breath-taking.
Despite the grandiose scheme of the Italian foreign minister, Gianni De
Michelis, for the EC to take over the WEU and make it responsible for security
matters, it is too soon to say whether the WEU is now set to play a major role
in West European defence policj. Its last revival, in the mid-eighties during
the controversy over President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, was no
less vigorous than today's, yet it fizzled out in no time. What happens next
depends on whether the current stalemate erupts into war, and, if it does, how it
erupts into war. At present, the governments of western Europe are lined up
behind the Americans (though even now their support is not unqualified). If Saddam
makes the first military move, it is unlikely that this will change. But if the
Americans decide to attempt to shoot Saddam out of Kuwait - at present an
unlikely prospect, but the whole situation could change after the 6 November
Congressional elections - western Europe will be in a quandary.
Many current supporters of American policy (including many
in government and nearly all the social democratic opposition parties) would
back a first move by the US only if diplomatic efforts had come to nought,
sanctions had proved ineffective and military victory could be guaranteed
quickly and with minimal loss of life. It is almost inconceivable that these
conditions could be fulfilled - particularly the last. If the body bags start
coming home, the current west European consensus backing America on the Gulf
will evaporate. But that is a scenario almost too horrible to contemplate.
